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R. v. Lloyd and the Unpredictable
Stability of Mandatory
Minimum Litigation
Asad G. Kiyani*

I. INTRODUCTION
The adjudication of the constitutionality of mandatory minimum
sentences by the Supreme Court of Canada presents a contradictory message.
On the one hand, cases challenging the constitutionality of mandatory
minimum sentences appear before the Court on a seemingly annual basis.
On the other hand, the actual treatment of those cases is anything but
routine, presenting divergent and at times contradictory messages within the
narrow range of mandatory minimum sentences jurisprudence, sentencing
law more generally, and the definition of Charter rights broadly speaking.
The Court’s decision in R. v. Lloyd1 is the latest iteration in this line of cases,
clarifying and confusing the state of the law in the best traditions of Charter
adjudication.
This article considers three dimensions of this mercurial jurisprudence,
outlining the current state of the law, its relationship to prior case law, and
implications for future decisions. The second part of the article addresses the
general signal sent by the Court to Parliament on its design of mandatory
minimum sentencing regimes. The Court has been clear that Parliament
can Charter-proof mandatory minimum sentences by crafting statutory
provisions in more narrow terms, or granting judges the statutory authority
to deviate from mandatory minimums in certain cases. However, the first of
these propositions is challenged by Lloyd, in which a narrowly-drafted
provision is ruled unconstitutional. The second represents an unexpected
departure from strong policy-based arguments presented in previous cases.
*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law – University of Victoria. Thanks are due to Arooba
Shakeel (JD 2018, Western) for her extensive research and helpful suggestions, to Andrew
Mendelson (JD 2019, Victoria) for his careful editing, and to Benjamin Berger, Sonia Lawrence, and
Wade Wright for their comments on earlier drafts.
1
[2016] S.C.J. No. 13, 2016 SCC 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereainafter “Lloyd”].
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The third part of this article situates Lloyd in the context of its
predecessor R. v. Nur,2 outlining the basic test to be applied. While the
Court in Lloyd purports to merely apply Nur, it takes an important but
under-acknowledged step in its construction of one of the reasonable
hypotheticals used by incorporating offender-specific characteristics into
its analysis. This novel step illustrates a growing fissure in the Court’s
jurisprudence on mandatory minimums, whereby the majority and
dissenting justices differ on their interpretation of the basic parameters
by which a reasonable hypothetical is to be constructed.
Having outlined these preliminary positions, the fourth part of the article
looks at the future of mandatory minimum sentences, and makes three
claims. First, it addresses the likelihood that Lloyd makes it easier than ever
to defeat mandatory minimum sentences. The post-Lloyd case law is
unclear on this point, and observers should be neither overly optimistic nor
pessimistic about the future of mandatory minimum sentences given the
inconsistencies in lower court decisions. Second, it argues that Lloyd may
make it harder for courts to find a section 123 violation given the Chief
Justice’s explicit connection of Lloyd to R. v. Lacasse, which confirms that
section 718.2(e)4 and Gladue5 principles are not part of the analysis under
section 12. The rejection of ‘proportionality’ as a principle of fundamental
justice and the concretization of ‘gross disproportionality’ thus gives little
scope for lower courts to incorporate certain fundamental principles of
sentencing into section 12 analyses.
Finally, this fourth part of the article examines the impact of this
ruling on substantive equality concerns, and the Court’s general
avoidance of substantive equality arguments even where concerns such
as race seem obvious on the facts of the case. To the extent that
mandatory minimum sentences are declared of no force and effect under
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,6 it appears that enumerated
or analogous grounds under section 15 of the Charter will have little role
to play in those decisions. In fact, the ongoing exclusion of substantive
equality considerations from section 12 jurisprudence makes it less likely
that a particular mandatory minimum sentence will be declared invalid.
Arguments that section 12 can be integrated with section 15 in a
2

[2015] S.C.J. No. 15, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”].
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
5
R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”].
6
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
3
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meaningful way are hindered by recent judicial changes in the
construction of proportionality for the purposes of section 12 review; the
decisions in Lloyd and Safarzadeh-Markali7 are both questionable and
yet consistent.
The article ultimately concludes that reactions to Lloyd are both
premature and overbroad. The future of mandatory minimum sentences
remains relatively opaque: they are here to stay for some time and for at
least some offences, but likely not all offences for which they have been
imposed. While Lloyd has opened up the terms on which reasonable
hypotheticals might be challenged, it has also suggested a number of
constraints remain. In particular, those of the view that Lloyd heralds the
automatic end of mandatory minimums ought to consider the lack of
attention paid to section 15 substantive equality grounds. The unwillingness
of the Court to recognize race as a feature in reasonable hypotheticals
avoids an outcome which would virtually guarantee the end of mandatory
minimum sentences for at least some offences. Thus, while Lloyd refines
the Court’s treatment of mandatory minimum sentences, its expansionist
approach to reasonable hypotheticals stops well short of planting a selfdestruct button in that jurisprudence.

II. MESSAGING TO PARLIAMENT: EXEMPTIONS & DRAFTING
Two threads have consistently presented themselves in mandatory
minimum sentences jurisprudence. First, the Court has continually warned
Parliament about how mandatory minimum legislation is drafted, asking for
the provisions to be defined more narrowly. Second, the Court has struggled
with the idea of using judicially-granted exemptions to preclude the
application of mandatory minimum sentences in appropriate cases.
In Lloyd, the Court suggested a statutory exemption scheme as another
option for insulating mandatory minimum sentences.8 This “residual judicial
discretion” was described as “a safety valve” that would allow judges the
ability to grant a lesser sentence in “exceptional cases”.9 As the Court notes,
such schemes do appear in numerous other jurisdictions, and observers will
also note that no parameters were explicitly placed on Parliament’s
discretion in designing such a scheme. Thus, it might be a general statutory
7
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, 2016 SCC 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Safarzadeh-Markhali”].
8
Supra, note 1, at para. 36.
9
Id.
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exemption that applied to a range of offences to which mandatory minimum
sentences attached,10 or it might take the form of an exemption attached to
every mandatory minimum. The latter has the benefit of allowing Parliament
to specify the criteria for exercising judicial discretion in respect of any
given offence, whilst also allowing certain minimums to be automatically
excluded from the statutory exemption scheme.
While some commentators have argued in favour of adopting an
exemption-based model,11 others have suggested that the statutory discretion
scheme briefly described in Lloyd is functionally the same as the
constitutional exemption concept rejected in Ferguson,12 and thus vulnerable
to at least some of the same critiques as the Chief Justice had deployed in
that case.13 Parliament can reap the political benefits of appearing tough-oncrime whilst the judiciary bogs itself down in appeals sorting out when
exemptions might be appropriate (and then, invariably, being criticized as
judicial activists for handing them out in a way that undermines the toughon-crime intent of Parliament). A number of the examples referred to by the
Court in Lloyd provide little statutory guidance on their face.14 If part of the
pressing rationales in Ferguson were to insist Parliament take ownership of
its role as the designer of the sentencing system, and to generate
predictability in sentencing, a statutory exemption scheme does little to
assure those outcomes.
10
Former Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler proposed just such a
provision in 2015 that applied to all mandatory minimum sentences. See Bill C-669, An Act to
amend the Criminal Code (independence of the judiciary), 2nd Sess, 41st Parl., 2015 (introduction
and first reading April 24, 2015).
11
P. Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring a Swift
Resolution” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 231-258, at 233 (referring to the difference between a
constitutional exemption that is offered during a suspended declaration of invalidity, such as that
offered to those who sought to benefit from a change to the prohibition against assisted-dying in
Carter v Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.) and ongoing
exemptions that are applied intermittently in perpetuity because the implicated law is not in fact
declared invalid).
12
R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Ferguson”].
13
D. Stuart, “Pragmatism and Inconsistency from the Supreme Court on Mandatory
Minimums” (2016) 27 Criminal Reports (7th) 245 [hereinafter “Stuart”].
14
See, e.g., ss. 86E, 102 and 103 of the Sentencing Act, 2002 (NZ), 2002/9 where
variance from the minimum penalty for murder is permitted if the minimum penalty would be
“manifestly unjust”, or if the court gives reasons for its decision not to apply life imprisonment;
s. 53(1)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (S Afr), No 105 of 1997 permits a
variance where the Court records its “substantial and compelling reasons”; ss. 109(3), 110(2)
and 111(2) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (U.K.), c. 6, which permit
variance from mandatory minimums for murder, certain drug trafficking offences, and a third
burglary conviction if the court states for the record the “exceptional circumstances” or
“particular circumstances” in the case.
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At the same time, the fact that an exemption would be incorporated
by statute and not the extraordinary reliance upon questionable judicial
interpretations of sections 24(1) and 52(1) powers mitigates a number of
the criticisms. The formalization of discretion through statutorilyprescribed exemptions reduces the sense of judicial activism that would
otherwise arise, and lends some predictability as case law develops under
the ambit of exemptions. Predictability may not be perfect, but it has
never been so in sentencing; to reject a scheme because of its lack of
certainty would be to discard wholesale the principles of individualization
of punishment.
The other way in which Lloyd sends a clear signal to Parliament on
statutory design is detached from the question of exemptions: “...If
Parliament hopes to sustain mandatory minimum penalties for offences
that cast a wide net, it should consider narrowing their reach so that they
only catch offenders that merit the mandatory minimum sentences.”15
Here the Court builds on its minimal impairment arguments in Nur,16
pushing for more careful attention to be paid to the design not of
exemptions but of the sentencing provisions themselves. If Parliament is
unwilling to adopt an exemption scheme for fear that it would lead to
exemptions becoming the norm, then it must create sentencing provisions
that are narrowly-defined and restrictive in their scope. At the time of
writing, Parliament’s response to Lloyd and the rise in the number of
mandatory minimum sentences remains uncertain.17

III. THE REASONABLE HYPOTHETICAL TEST IN NUR AND LLOYD
1. Loose Drafting Defined
The problem that has been set for Parliament is determining how
narrowly a statute must be drafted in order to satisfy the Court’s
directions. The statements of the majority in Lloyd must be compared
with the actual reasoning in the case, in which the Court used
15

Supra, note 1, at para. 35.
Supra, note 2, at para. 117: “Parliament could have achieved its objective by drafting an
offence with a close correspondence between conduct attracting significant moral blameworthiness
… and the mandatory minimum, rather than a sweeping law…”.
17
Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould has promised an all-encompassing review of
the Criminal Code, including mandatory minimum sentences, but no concrete reforms have been
undertaken. See, e.g., “Liberals Eye Changes to Mandatory Minimum Sentences”, Canadian Press
(May 7, 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>.
16
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“reasonable hypotheticals” to rule unconstitutional the mandatory
minimum sentences attached to what appeared to be the fairly narrowly
drafted prohibitions of section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act.18 The Chief Justice’s own summary of the offence
illustrates the specificity:
To be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of
imprisonment, an offender must be convicted of trafficking, or of
possession for the purpose of trafficking, of either any quantity of a
Schedule I substance, such as cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine,
or three kilograms or more of a Schedule II substance, namely
cannabis: s. 5(3)(a) and (a.1), CDSA. The offender must also have
been convicted within the previous 10 years of a ‘designated
substance offence’, which is defined at s. 2(1) of the CDSA as any
offence under Part I of the CDSA other than simple possession.19

As the dissenting judges noted, the prohibition appears quite
particular:20 confined to traffickers of either the most serious drugs,21 or
of large quantities of less serious drugs, who had been convicted of
trafficking, importing, exporting or producing a drug within the previous
decade. That the majority nonetheless found the provision to run afoul of
repeated admonitions to Parliament to draft offences as narrowly as
possible points to the difficulty facing legislators in this area.
The legislation was found to apply to a great deal of offenders who
might represent a wide range of blameworthiness. For all its specificity, the
provision treated those who traffick for profit the same as those addicts who
possess much smaller amounts for sharing in more intimate circumstances:
with friends, spouses, and other addicts.22 The finding of broad applicability
also turned in part on the broad definition of “trafficking” under the CDSA
which includes not just those who sell drugs, but those who “give”, “send”,
“transfer” or “deliver” drugs. While the delivery of drugs, for example, is
no doubt integral to the trafficking operation of the “professional drug
dealer”, McLachlin C.J.C. notes that the definition of trafficking does not
include considering the motive of the individual or their intent to profit
from their trafficking.23 Finally, the “designated substance offence” lumps a
18

S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”].
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 6.
20
Id., at para. 102.
21
Schedule I to the CDSA includes drugs such as heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines,
and fentanyl.
22
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 29.
23
Id., at para. 30.
19
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broad range of conduct together, including the CDSA’s core prohibitions
against importing, exporting, producing, trafficking or obtaining prohibited
substances.24 Thus a provision that appears at first sight to be quite specific
may not actually be so narrow or constrained.
The majority’s finding of breadth within section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) might be
criticized for demanding too much of Parliament through its close editorial
supervision of the statute, as the dissent in Lloyd suggests. However, it might
also fairly be understood as an indication from the majority that the
complexity of a statutory provision does not equate to adequate specificity for
the purposes of section 12 of the Charter. That the provision could have been
phrased more broadly (for example, by including simple possession as a
designated substance offence, or by removing the 10-year period for the prior
conviction) does not mean that it has been phrased in sufficiently narrow
terms. When determining the breadth of a mandatory minimum sentence,
judges ought to work out the full implications of the relevant prohibition(s).
2. General Parameters of Reasonable Hypotheticals
Part of working through the full implications of the prohibition is
testing the breadth of not just the conduct it captures, but the
circumstances it captures and subjects to the mandatory minimum
sentence. To this end, the natural progression in the section 12 analysis
has become to construct a reasonable hypothetical — an offender in
some fact-specific situation — that can test the law.
In doing this, the Court in Lloyd relied on the section 12 test
established in a series of cases and most clearly articulated in Nur:
[A] challenge to a mandatory minimum sentencing provision on the
ground it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the
Charter involves two steps. First, the court must determine what
constitutes a proportionate sentence for the offence having regard to the
objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code. Then, the
court must ask whether the mandatory minimum requires the judge to
impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the fit and
proportionate sentence. If the answer is yes, the mandatory minimum
provision is inconsistent with s. 12 and will fall unless justified under s. 1
of the Charter.25
24
The “designated substance offences” of ss. 4-10 are the “true crime” provisions of the
CDSA, but the Act does contain other offences (such as s. 43, for a breach of an administrative order
under Part V of the CDSA).
25
Supra, note 2, at para. 46.

124

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The second step of the Nur test itself contains two stages. First, the
court must consider whether it is obligated by the mandatory minimum
sentence to impose a grossly disproportionate sentence to the specific
offender before it, having due regard to the factors ordinarily considered
as part of fashioning a fit and proportionate sentence. In addition, the
sentencing or reviewing court also has the authority to consider
constitutional challenges to legislation even in situations where the law
itself did not violate the rights of the particular offender opposing the
law.26 In this second stage, the court may consider a “reasonable
hypothetical” in which the imposition of the mandatory minimum
“would be grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable cases.”27
These cases cannot be “marginally imaginable” or “far-fetched”; they
must reflect “a situation that may reasonably be expected to arise”.28
There is no requirement for provincial courts to engage in the second
stage of the test, but the Court in Lloyd clarified that they are permitted
to do so (whilst lacking the power to declare the law of no force and
effect under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982).29 Superior
courts clearly have the same ability, as well as the added power of
applying section 52(1), but it is not clear that they are obligated to
consider reasonable hypotheticals.30 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
done so in every situation presented before it, and the growing use of
reasonable hypotheticals by trial courts suggests that all reviewing courts
will invariably engage in the analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals”.
Whether or not a court chooses to apply the entirety of the test, the
turn to a “reasonable hypothetical” should not automatically lead to
findings of unconstitutionality. According to the majority in Nur, it “set a
26

Drawing on the statement of Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J.
No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 314, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.) that “...[i]t is the nature of the law,
not the status of the accused, that is in issue” in s. 52 claims. In the specific context of mandatory
minimums, see Ferguson, supra, note 12, at para. 59: “...[a] claimant who otherwise has standing
can generally seek a declaration of invalidity under s. 52 on the grounds that a law has
unconstitutional effects either in his own case or on third parties.”
27
Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 57.
28
Id., at para. 56.
29
Supra, note 1, at paras. 16-18. The Court did not address the question of whether denying
provincial courts any authority under s. 52(1) would be problematic in that it would require
duplication of proceedings across multiple trial courts that were not bound by other trial decisions;
would deny indigent accused persons the ability to benefit from successful s. 12 challenges raised by
other defendants in other trials; or would permit the Crown to shield a law found to be
unconstitutional under s. 12, and continue to apply it, by simply failing to appeal unfavourable
rulings at the trial level. See Factum of the Intervener, Criminal Lawyers Association.
30
Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 58: “…a court may look … at other reasonably foreseeable
situations where the impugned law may apply.” (emphasis added)
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high bar” for finding cruel and unusual punishment under section 12.
This supposed elevated standard is in keeping with numerous judicial
pronouncements: that “...[w]e should be careful not to stigmatize every
disproportionate or excessive sentence as being a constitutional
violation”;31 that hypotheticals should reflect circumstances that “could
commonly arise in day-to-day life”;32 and, that any such hypothetical
analyses should be based on or present facts that are “‘common’ rather
than ‘extreme’ or ‘far-fetched’.”33 Embedded in this 30-year history is a
consistent deference towards Parliament’s intent and prerogative in the
design and imposition of mandatory minimum sentences, one that should
not be easily overcome by reference to section 12.
3. Challenging the Reasonable Hypotheticals in Lloyd
In Nur, as well as in each of its companion cases34 and Lloyd itself,
this multi-stage analysis manifested as a split result after both stages of
the second part of the test had been applied. In almost every case, the
mandatory minimum sentence was held to be appropriate as applied to
the actual offender(s) challenging the law, whilst also being found more
generally to violate section 12 under the reasonable hypothetical
analysis.35 In other words, statutory provisions have consistently been
declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect under section 52(1)
of the Constitution notwithstanding the Court’s view that no tangible
person has been disadvantaged by them.
Given this disconnect between outcomes in the first and second stages
of the Nur test, the proper construction of the reasonable hypothetical
31
R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 at 1072, 40 D.L.R. (4th) 435
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
32
R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 at 516, 61 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”].
33
R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 at para. 33
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”].
34
The constitutionality of s. 95(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code, supra, note 4, was
challenged in Nur, supra, note 2, as well as five other cases: R. v. Smickle, [2013] O.J. No. 5070,
2013 ONCA 678, 304 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Smickle”]; R. v. Rocheleau, [2013]
O.J. No. 5137, 2013 ONCA 679, 311 O.A.C. 295 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Chambers, [2013] O.J. No.
5116, 2013 ONCA 680, 311 O.A.C. 307 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Charles, [2013] O.J. No. 5115, 2013
ONCA 681, 117 O.R. (3d) 456 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. Meszaros, [2013] O.J. No. 5113, 2013 ONCA
682, 309 C.C.C. (3d) 392 (Ont. C.A.). Of the six cases, only Smickle was decided on the basis that
the mandatory minimum was excessive as applied to Mr. Smickle himself. Overall, only Charles and
Nur were granted leave to appeal; the two cases were heard together at the Supreme Court.
35
One notable exception being Smickle, id., at paras. 31-33.
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takes on central importance. The requirement of reasonable foreseeability
and the aversion to “marginal” or “far-fetched” all are intended to
prevent the construction of reasonable hypotheticals that automatically
produce grossly disproportionate sentences and therefore negate virtually
every mandatory minimum: “...This excludes using personal features to
construct the most innocent and sympathetic case imaginable … the
inquiry must be grounded in common sense and experience.”36
At the same time, “personal characteristics cannot be entirely
excluded”37 from the analysis. In Nur, the impugned law imposed a
minimum sentence of three or five years on an offender convicted of
possessing prohibited loaded firearms. Mr. Nur and Mr. Charles did not
benefit from the Court’s declaration of invalidity of subsection 95(2)(a)(i)
and (ii) of the Criminal Code because they both possessed weapons in
circumstances more akin to “truly criminal conduct”.38 Yet the Court was
concerned about the reasonably foreseeable “licensed and responsible
gun owner” who improperly and unwittingly stored a licensed weapon in
a manner that infringed the statute:39 “...The bottom line is that s. 95(1)
foreseeably catches licensing offences which involve little or no moral
fault and little or no danger to the public.”40
The decision in Lloyd is controversial in part because it relies on a highly
specific and sympathetic accused person as part of the reasonable
hypothetical, individualized beyond the generic licensed and responsible gun
owner or unprepared inheritor41 envisaged in Nur. Two hypotheticals were
relied upon to show the gross disproportionality occasioned by the law. In
the first, an addict might be sentenced to the mandatory minimum of one
year imprisonment for sharing a small amount of a Schedule I drug such as
cocaine with a friend or spouse, nine years after receiving her only other
criminal conviction for sharing marijuana at a party.42 Here, the minimal
moral blameworthiness of sharing plays a key role in the majority’s
declaration that a year in prison would be shocking to Canadians.43
36
Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 75. In the same paragraph, the majority warned that in the
absence of such constraints, “almost any mandatory minimum could be argued to violate s. 12 and
lawyerly ingenuity would be the only limit to findings of unconstitutionality.”
37
Id., at para. 74.
38
To use the phrasing of Doherty J.A. in R. v. Nur, [2013] O.J. No. 5120, 2013 ONCA 677,
117 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 51 (Ont. C.A.).
39
Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 82.
40
Id., at para. 83.
41
Id.
42
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 32.
43
Id.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MANDATORY MINIMUM LITIGATION

127

The second reasonable hypothetical is more involved, involving a
drug addict whose activities fall closer to the professional drug dealing of
a stereotypical trafficker:
...A drug addict with a prior conviction for trafficking is convicted of a
second offence. In both cases, he was only trafficking in order to
support his own addiction. Between conviction and the sentencing, he
goes to a rehabilitation centre and conquers his addiction. He comes to
the sentencing court asking for a short sentence that will allow him to
resume a healthy and productive life.44

According to the Court, imposing a one-year sentence on this
vulnerable but rehabilitated offender would “shock the conscience of
Canadians.”45
The majority’s construction of hypotheticals in this case is the source
of deep controversy. First, as the dissenting opinion points out, these
circumstances sound very similar to that of Mr. Lloyd himself, who had
already conceded that the minimum sentence was appropriate in his
circumstances.46 Mr. Lloyd was described by the sentencing judge as a
low-level drug dealer who trafficked to support his own addiction. Lloyd
had engaged in some nascent attempts at rehabilitation between the two
relevant convictions that triggered the mandatory minimum sentence,
and requested a sentence of three to four months.47 How then could a
reasonable hypothetical based on essentially the same facts lead to a
finding of gross disproportionality?
Ironically, given the clear signals to Parliament to draft legislation
carefully, specifically, and narrowly, the answer would seem to lie in a
relatively lax approach to defining the hypothetical and distinguishing it
from Lloyd himself. At the time of his arrest, Lloyd was carrying three
different Schedule I drugs — cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.
His prior conviction had been for possession of methamphetamine for the
purpose of trafficking, and he had been released about one month before
the arrest that exposed him to the mandatory minimum sentence. In
addition, Lloyd was convicted of five further offences after this,
including for several possession offences.48 By contrast, the majority’s
hypothetical tweaks the facts of Lloyd’s situation (although it does not
44
45
46
47
48

Id., at para. 33.
Id.
Id., at para. 25.
R. v. Lloyd, [2014] B.C.J. No. 274, 2014 BCPC 8, at paras. 18-22, 29-33 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
Id.
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explicitly say so) into a more sympathetic circumstance where the
offender has successfully completed a rehabilitation program (as opposed
to tentatively investigated one) and presumably lacks the extensive
criminal record of Lloyd.
More clarity on this point might have strengthened the utility of that
example, but the two reasonable hypotheticals employed by the majority
nonetheless raise valid questions about the section 12 process. Is the
situation of the hypothetical drug addict so close to the facts of the
instant case as to suggest that there is nothing grossly disproportionate
about the sentence imposed?49 Or, does this adjustment of the facts of
Lloyd violate the requirement that the reasonable hypothetical be
reasonably foreseeable, neither marginal nor far-fetched? For example,
would the offender in that situation even receive the second conviction,
the one that triggers the mandatory minimum sentence, or would he be
diverted into a drug treatment program that would preclude a conviction
if successfully completed?
The majority’s response is that such schemes are insufficient to
insulate the law from section 12 review: such programs are unavailable
in most jurisdictions, and may be inaccessible even where they exist;
admission usually requires a guilty plea and waiver of the right to a fair
trial; such programs are onerous for heavily addicted accused; and,
finally, the Crown generally retains the discretion to disqualify
individuals from participation. For the majority, Crown discretion cannot
operate as a constitutional protection against grossly disproportionate
punishment;50 for the dissent, relying on Goltz,51 where the described
conduct might constitute a lesser or different offence, then it cannot
constitute a reasonable hypothetical. There is no mention made here of
the role of Crown discretion in charging decisions, even though
presumably it is that discretion which shields the offender.
In addition, how much emphasis is to be placed on reasonable
hypotheticals developed from reported cases? On this last point, the
dissenting opinion argues that the first hypothetical, of the offender who
shares, is not reasonable because either that offender would not suffer the
first conviction (which could be construed as joint possession of
49

Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 100.
Id., at para. 34, citing Nur, supra, note 2, at 94.
51
Goltz, supra, note 32 (deciding that a mandatory minimum sentence of seven days’
imprisonment for driving with a suspended licence did not violate s. 12, and that the reasonable
hypothetical posed by the respondent-offender would not arise because it is almost certain that the
hypothetical accused would succeed with a defence of necessity and therefore not be convicted).
50
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marijuana depending, one supposes, on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion), or because there are very few cases where repeat offenders
have no other intervening convictions. Contrary to established cases on
section 12, she would be the most sympathetic offender imaginable52 —
presumably in part because of her awful luck.

IV. THE FUTURE OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS
For some commentators, Lloyd is the logical conclusion of section 12
jurisprudence and the reasonable hypothetical analysis: that the Court’s
warning about making it too easy to construct a sympathetic reasonable
hypothetical was one that would be overtaken by the laxity that would be
applied to the constraints of “far-fetched” and “marginally imaginable”.53
Certainly the unwillingness to find unconstitutionality on the basis of the
first stage of the test might reflect the “high bar” promised in Nur. Yet for at
least three reasons it is perhaps premature to suggest that the second stage
of the test will lead to automatic eliminations of mandatory minimum
sentences: judges have exhibited mixed tendencies in utilizing section 12;
the Supreme Court’s accumulated rulings on proportionality in the
sentencing context justify precluding the consideration of factors that would
ordinarily be relevant to determining a fit sentence; and, continuing judicial
reluctance to adapt arguably the most powerful tool of resistance to
mandatory minimum sentences, the disparate impacts generated by them
not for individuals but for historically disadvantaged groups.
1. Judicial Practice
First, the actual response of the judiciary to the Court’s interpretation
of reasonable hypotheticals in Lloyd has been mixed, just as it was after
Smith and its successor cases up to and including Nur. Some mandatory
minimum sentences are struck down, and others are not, suggesting that
52

Id., at paras. 89-95.
See, e.g., Stuart, supra, note 13, (that post-Lloyd and Nur, “many of the 60 or mandatory
minimums should fall”); W.K. Gorman, “The Death of Mandatory Minimum Periods of Imprisonment in
Canada” (2016) 52:3 Court Review 96, at 99 (“Nur and Lloyd appear to have taken an approach
that suggests mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment will be consistently declared to be
unconstitutional in Canada”); and, Lincoln Caylor and Gannon G. Beaulne, Parliamentary Restrictions
on Judicial Discretion in Sentencing: A Defence of Mandatory Minimum Sentences (Ottawa: MacdonaldLaurier Institute, 2014) at 19 (warning that “the gross disproportionality test is a discretionary analysis
left in the hands of the Canadian judiciary … it could quickly become a means through which judges can
usurp Parliament’s power to enact valid criminal sentences…”).
53
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lower court judges are finding a balance between Parliament’s intent and
the flexibility afforded by cases such as Nur and Lloyd. This should not
be surprising. After all, the decision and tests outlined in Nur are
grounded in Smith, Morrisey and Latimer,54 amongst others. Only in
Smith was the law declared unconstitutional; in the other two cases, the
appellate courts overturned lower court declarations of invalidity.
While lower courts have struck down some mandatory minimums,55
including on the basis of Lloyd,56 they have preserved them in respect of
other offences even as the law on reasonable hypotheticals evolved. In Li,57
the court upheld the constitutionality of section 7(2)(b)(iii) of the CDSA.58
In the post-Lloyd cases of McIntyre59 and McIvor,60 a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years for armed robbery was upheld.61 In Oud,62 the British
Columbia Court of Appeal overturned a lower court decision that had found
section 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code63 to be unconstitutional. In that
case, the appellate court explicitly used Lloyd as the basis for determining
the provision was in fact constitutional.64 As they have for the last several
years, predictions about the floodgates of unconstitutionality findings
remain unproven even after Lloyd.
2. Gross Disproportionality as Applied to the Accused
While it may be argued that Lloyd has changed prior understandings
of the reasonable hypothetical for the purposes of the second stage of
the section 12 analysis, Lloyd has not fundamentally altered the first
stage of the test. Courts have regularly (but not always) failed to consider
54
R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (upholding
the mandatory minimum punishment for murder and refusing to allow a constitutional exemption).
55
For pre-Lloyd cases, see R. v. R. (E.R.D.), [2016] B.C.J. No. 774, 2016 BCSC 684
(B.C.S.C.); R. v. Badali, [2016] O.J. No. 544, 2016 ONSC 788 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Flaro, [2014] O.J.
No. 94, 2014 ONCJ 2 (Ont. C.J.).
56
In R. v. Dickey, [2016] B.C.J. No. 815, 2016 BCCA 177, 335 C.C.C. (3d) 478
(B.C.C.A.), the Court predictably struck down s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (C) of the CDSA, which were
parallel provisions to s. 5(3)(a)(ii)(D), which was ruled unconstitutional in Lloyd.
57
R. v. Li, [2016] O.J. No. 1371, 2016 ONSC 1757 (Ont. S.C.J.).
58
Imposing a one-year minimum for growing between 201 and 500 marijuana plants.
59
R. v. McIntyre, [2017] O.J. No. 178, 2017 ONSC 360, 2017 CarswellOnt 342 (Ont. S.C.J.).
60
R. v. McIvor, [2017] M.J. No. 52, 2017 MBPC 11, 2017 CarswellMan 64 (Man. Prov.
Ct.) [hereinafter “McIvor”].
61
Under s. 344(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, supra, note 4.
62
R. v. Oud, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1589, 2016 BCCA 332, 339 C.C.C. (3d) 379 (B.C.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Oud”].
63
Imposing a minimum four-year sentence for the reckless discharge of a firearm.
64
Oud, supra, note 62, at paras. 32 et seq., 43-44.
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section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code,65 in their assessment of whether a
mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate in a particular case.
Section 718.2(e) requires that a sentencing judge consider all measures
short of incarceration when fashioning a fit sentence for an accused,
paying “particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal
offenders.”66 The fact that the introduction of this provision did little to
ameliorate the over-representation of Indigenous accused and offenders
in the criminal justice system was noted by the Supreme Court in its
decision in Gladue.67 There, the Court described this over-representation
as “a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system”,68 and mandated that
all sentencing courts apply a new framework to Indigenous offenders in
order to determine “whether an aboriginal offender will go to jail or
whether other sentencing options may be employed which will play
perhaps a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender,
victim, and community, and in preventing future crime.”69
Yet Gladue has done little to remedy the problem it was intended to
address, as Indigenous rates of imprisonment have increased even as
imprisonment rates for non-Indigenous offenders decline.70 The situation
that was described as a “crisis” in Gladue saw Indigenous adults making up
12 per cent of federal inmate admissions. By 2005, that number had risen to
17 per cent.71 In 2014 to 2015, the number was 25 per cent, even though
Indigenous adults were only three per cent of the general population.72
A similar phenomenon can be identified with respect to African-Canadians.
According to the Correctional Investigator of Canada, the federal inmate
65

Supra, note 4.
Id.
67
Supra, note 5.
68
Id., at para. 64.
69
Id., at para. 65.
70
R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No. 13, 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, at paras. 61-63
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”]. See also J. Rudin, “Aboriginal Over-representation and R. v.
Gladue: Where We Were, Where We Are and Where We Might Be Going” (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)
687-713 (suggesting that the reason for this disparity is rooted in part in the lack of competence of
courts and lawyers to gather appropriate information about an offender and his or her circumstances
before fashioning a sentence).
71
Ipeelee, id., at para. 62.
72
According to Justice Canada, 26 per cent of provincial/territorial inmates in 2014 to 2015
were Indigenous. The imbalance was more pronounced for Indigenous women, who were
imprisoned at a rate 12 times that of their representation in the general population. Indigenous youth
were imprisoned at a rate five times that of their representation in the general population. Youth
were 37 per cent of admissions, but only seven per cent of the general population. Justice Canada –
Research and Statistics Division, “Indigenous overrepresentation in the criminal justice system”
(Jan. 2017), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/jf-pf/2017/jan02.html>.
66
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population grew by 10 per cent between 2005 and 2015; in that time, the
African-Canadian inmate population grew by 69 per cent.73
The question remains whether consideration of section 718.2(e) would
make a tangible difference to some sentences. Ryan Newell74 argues that in
at least some cases, a significant disparity can be identified. In Bouchard,75
an accused received a sentence of four months after a pre-sentence report
and application of the Gladue framework; that same offence is now subject
to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years.76 It would be difficult to
argue that a mandatory minimum that is five times longer than the imposed
sentence is not grossly disproportionate.
Notwithstanding Parliamentary and judicial pronouncements on the
importance of section 718.2(e) and Gladue, both frameworks are noticeably
absent from the mandatory minimum sentence jurisprudence, and have
been for many years.77 There is no mention made of Gladue at all in Nur,
Lloyd, or Ferguson, and section 718.2(e) is only referenced when the
dissenting opinion in Lloyd attempts to justify the ability of mandatory
minimums to override competing sentencing principles.78 It is no surprise
then that the failure to fully consider section 718.2(e) and Gladue is often
apparent in section 12 challenges to mandatory minimum sentences. In
Bressette,79 Desotti J. acknowledged that his sentencing discretion had been
only partially fettered by the mandatory minimum to be applied to the
Indigenous offender before him. Yet he neither applied the reasonable
hypothetical analysis nor considered the offender’s Indigenous status in
assessing the constitutionality of the provision.80 Similar analyses took
place in Sheppard81 and in McIvor,82 where the trial judge mentioned the
Indigenous status of the offender but did not refer to it in assessing the
constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence.
73
H. Sapers, 11th Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator of Canada 2014-2015
(June 26, 2015), online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.aspx>.
74
R. Newell, “Making Matters Worse: the Safe Streets and Communities Act and the
Ongoing Crisis of Indigenous Over-Incarceration” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 199-249.
75
R. v. Bouchard, [2012] O.J. No. 3131, 2012 ONCJ 425 (Ont. C.J.).
76
Section 5(3)(a)(ii)(C) of the CDSA, supra, note 18, as amended by the Safe Streets and
Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1.
77
Larry Chartrand expresses concern about some judges not addressing these concepts as
early as 2001. L.N. Chartrand, “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 449-467.
78
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 103.
79
R. v. Bressette, [2010] O.J. No. 3741, 2010 ONSC 3831 (Ont. S.C.J.).
80
The judge did note that the mandatory minimum set a new floor for punishment, and that
the illegal use of firearms was a danger to Indigenous communities.
81
R. v. Sheppard, [2011] N.J. No. 252, 241 C.R.R. (2d) 14, 2011 CanLII 41607 (N.L. Prov. Ct.).
82
Supra, note 60.
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It is unclear that the assessment of these factors in any particular
offender’s case would lead to a finding of gross disproportionality, but it
is clear that — given the desire to find appropriate non-carceral
sentences that animates both section 718.2(e) and Gladue — those
concepts tend to promote such a finding in the face of a requirement to
imprison any and all offenders. In defending the ability of Parliament to
introduce legislation that explicitly sought to prevent the application of
other statutory and fundamental rules of sentencing, McLachlin C.J.C.
declared that Parliament could balance denunciation, deterrence and
other goals through mandatory minimums.83
This is a slightly different position than that staked out in the
dissenting opinion of Gascon J. that she joined in Lacasse.84 There, the
justices first reflected the reasons in Ipeelee that proportionality requires
considering parity alongside proportionality (including the offender’s
degree of responsibility),85 and then described as over-simplistic the
near-automatic reversion to imprisonment when Parliament chose to
emphasize denunciation and deterrence:
...In my view, the courts should not automatically assume that
imprisonment is always the preferred sanction for the purpose of meeting
these objectives. To do so would be contrary to other sentencing
principles. Rather, a court must consider ‘all available sanctions, other
than imprisonment’, that are reasonable in the circumstances: s. 718.2(e)
Cr. C.; Gladue, at para. 36.86

To the extent that these factors are not considered in the first branch
of the section 12 test, the ability to challenge mandatory minimum
sentences is weakened.
3. Personal Characteristics and Reasonable Hypotheticals after
Lloyd
One reason that the floodgates might be seen as far from open is that
not only has the Supreme Court largely neglected to take up the issue,
but it has also explicitly disavowed its own comments in recent cases
83

Lloyd, supra, note 1, at para. 45.
R. v. Lacasse, [2015] S.C.J. No. 64, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Lacasse”]. In fairness to the Chief Justice, Gascon J. did not acknowledge his Lacasse
dissent either when he joined Wagner and Brown JJ. in writing the dissent in Lloyd.
85
Id., at para. 131 (dissenting reasons of Gascon J.).
86
Id., at para. 132.
84
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about proportionality in sentencing. In Ipeelee, writing on the sentencing of
two Indigenous offenders, the Court unanimously agreed87 that the failure
of a sentencing judge to take into account systemic and background factors
“would violate the fundamental principle of sentencing — that the sentence
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of
responsibility of the offender.”88 Writing for the majority, LeBel J. said
“[p]roportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction” and “could aptly be
described as a principle of fundamental justice”.89
These phrases were then adopted by the Court in its unanimous
decision in Anderson,90 only to be dismissed in Lloyd and SafarzadehMarkhali on the basis that adopting proportionality under section 7 of the
Charter would lead to a lower standard than that of section 12 review,
and therefore subsume section 12 into section 7 for these purposes.91 This
certainly raises a coherence problem, but surely it asks the wrong
question. Rather than focusing on whether this is a formal disconnect
between section 7 and section 12, or whether one renders the other
redundant, perhaps the Court should have returned its attention to the
question of whether gross disproportionality is or was ever the correct
standard for section 12 review.
One consequence of insisting on gross disproportionality as the
appropriate standard for constitutional review — and negating the
availability of proportionality simpliciter — is that it excludes the ability
of judges to craft sentences that consider proportionality in its full
substantive sense: that connect the sentence imposed to the moral
blameworthiness of the offender, and consider the appropriateness of the
sentence in the context of that particular offender. Mandatory minimum
sentences focus on the question of whether like offences are receiving
like sentences, bypassing key components of proportionality — the
offender and her circumstances — entirely, contrary to the warning of
LeBel J. in Ipeelee that “...[c]ourts must ensure that a formalistic
approach to parity in sentencing does not undermine the remedial
purpose of s. 718.2(e).”92 The emphasis on parity, and its associated
prioritization of denunciation and the seriousness of the offence as
87

Justice Rothstein dissented in part, but not on these points: Ipeelee, supra, note 70.
Id., at para. 73 (emphasis in original).
89
Id., at paras. 37 and 36.
90
R. v. Anderson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 41, 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, at para. 21
(S.C.C.). In that case, the Court rejected the idea that proportionality required not just judges but also
the Crown to consider Gladue principles.
91
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at paras. 40-42.
92
Ipeelee, supra, note 70, at para. 79.
88
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near-determinative factors undermines the substantive equality-generating
provisions of both section 718.2(e) and Gladue.
As noted above, this exclusion often appears in the first stage of the
section 12 test, but it also reproduces itself in the design of reasonable
hypotheticals under the second branch. In none of its section 12 reasonable
hypothetical jurisprudence has the Court considered Indigenous status or
race or any other sort of historical disadvantage that might be relevant in the
ordinary sentencing analysis. In Nur, Doherty J.A. writing for a panel of five
judges at the Ontario Court of Appeal, dismissed the section 15 argument in
one paragraph by adopting the trial judge’s reasons on the point.93
The argument of Code J. at trial in Nur was essentially that there was
no section 15 claim to be made because the law itself was facially neutral
and did not cause the disproportionate application of the law to Black
males.94 From this view, the application of the law being discriminatory
says nothing about whether the law itself needs to be remedied. Without
going into the merits of this position as a section 15 argument, it is
important to note that causation has little role to play in section 718.2(e)
and Gladue arguments about proportionality in sentencing.95 There, the
fact of over-representation is the crisis to be ameliorated,96 and the
appropriate sentence for the individual is contextualized by her
experiences as a member of a particular over-represented community and
her associated historical disadvantage.97 Ipeelee was a concerted
reminder to sentencing judges that section 718.2(e) needs to be
considered in all cases, especially those involving Indigenous offenders,
even when the offence is serious.98 Regardless of the state of the law on
section 15, section 12 is agnostic as to the cause of the disproportionate
effect; it is concerned only with the ability of the sentencing judge to
provide some remedy through crafting a fully proportionate sentence.99
93
R. v. Nur, [2013] O.J. No. 5120, 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 182 (Ont.
C.A.): “I agree with the analysis and conclusion of the trial judge at paras. 74-82. There is no breach
of s. 15.”
94
R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 2011 ONSC 4874, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 330, at paras. 78-79
(Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Nur (S.C.J.)”].
95
Gladue, supra, note 5, at para. 65; Ipeelee, supra, note 70, at para. 61.
96
Ipeelee, supra, note 70, at para. 56.
97
Id., at para. 60.
98
Id., at paras. 85-87 (referring to the “unwarranted emphasis” placed on the Court’s
statement in Gladue that there is less likely to be a sentence adjustment when the conviction is for a
serious crime).
99
See also J. Rudin and K. Roach, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’
‘Empty Promises’” (2002), 65 Sask. L. Rev. 3-34 (that it would be illogical to argue that s. 718.2(e) can
only be effective to the extent that sentencing practices cause the over-representation to be remedied).
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To the extent that mandatory minimums exclude the consideration of
these factors — and to be clear, minimum sentences make non-custodial
sentences statutorily impermissible — then the fundamental principle of
proportionality is clearly violated.
The explanation of how proportionality has become diluted for the
purposes of section 12 is a multi-faceted one. Jamie Cameron is right to
point out that the turn to section 7 as a means of asserting substantive and
not merely procedural rights set the stage for weakening other substantive
rights and denying them the robust application they otherwise ought to
have developed.100 Yet the diminution of proportionality is also the product
of several other forces that in large part originate with a Court that has not
only acquiesced to Parliamentary assertiveness that reduces judicial
discretion in sentencing by making some features of proportionality
inaccessible but also actively enabled that circumscription.
The first of these features is in some ways the most contested in the
context of mandatory minimum sentences. Notwithstanding that several
mandatory minimums have been declared unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court has arguably been overly deferential to Parliament in its imposition
of mandatory minimum sentences. At no point has the Court declared
that mandatory minimum sentences are inherently problematic because
they conflict with fundamental sentencing principles. Rather, the Court
has gone out of its way to advise Parliament on how to better craft
mandatory minimums in order to protect them from constitutional
review. To be fair, advising Parliament on the constitutionality of
legislation is part of the Court’s job, but as part of this the Court has also
declared that Parliament has the general power to fetter judicial
discretion through minimum sentences.
Second, this erosion of judicial discretion has been enabled by
judicial pronouncements on the scope and strength of proportionality as a
foundational concept of sentencing. This extends beyond the decision to
anoint gross disproportionality as the constitutional standard for section 12
review, and includes the retrenchment from ordinary principles of
sentencing review. In R. v. M. (C.A.) and a number of subsequent cases
spanning nearly two decades, the Court averred that errors in principle
could justify judicial review of a lower court’s sentencing determination
even in the absence of evidence that the sentence itself was demonstrably

100
J. Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008), 40
S.C.L.R. (2d) 553-592.
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unfit.101 This confirmed the importance of not only the ultimate penalty
itself when determining the propriety of a sentence, but the importance of
ensuring that all relevant factors were taken into consideration when that
penalty was being shaped; this is proportionality in its fullest sense.
However, there has been a clear retreat from this position in recent
times, most notably in Lacasse. In that case, the dissenting opinion of
McLachlin C.J.C. and Gascon J. reiterated the M. (C.A.) principle,102 but
was overridden by Wagner J.’s declaration that intervention was only
justified if the error in principle or failure to consider relevant factors
would have had affected the ultimate sentence.103 Here, the Court
takes an important step towards subordinating the right process of
determining a sentence. This includes by implication the failure to attend to
section 718.2(e). The difficulty is assessing how such a failure impacts on
the final disposition when central features are unknown to the sentencing
judge, and are unobtainable by the reviewing court that is forced to
assess fitness based on a limited record. The wealth of information that
goes into an appropriate Gladue report, for example, would seem
profoundly important to determining if the ultimate disposition is an
appropriate one. Being able to intervene even where it is not apparent
on its face that the sentence is itself out of line takes on renewed
importance in such circumstances. By moving away from a robust
enforcement of sentencing principles in a holistic sense, the Court
validates Parliamentary processes that formally preclude holistic and
individualized sentencing.
Finally, the Court participates in Parliamentary depredation of
proportionality under section 12 through the very tangible ways in which
it constructs reasonable hypotheticals. One of the curious features of
Lloyd is that it presents a very personalized offender in its second
hypothetical involving a rehabilitated drug addict. This is curious
because of the lack of attention otherwise paid to similar circumstances
in other cases, particularly Nur. In Nur, Code J. not only failed to
account for the accused’s status as a young Black man charged with an
offence for which African-Canadians were disproportionately charged in
101
[1996] S.C.J. No. 28, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327, at para. 90 (S.C.C.). See
also, R. v. McDonell, [1997] S.C.J. No. 42, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 948, 145 D.L.R. (4th) 577, at para. 17
(S.C.C.); R. v. L.M., [2008] S.C.J. No. 31, 2008 SCC 31, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, at paras. 14-15
(S.C.C.); and R. v. Nasogalauk, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 46
(S.C.C.).
102
Supra, note 84, at paras. 135-143.
103
Id., at para. 43.
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Toronto,104 he also justified his dismissal of this feature on the basis that
it could apply broadly to challenge a range of criminal laws:
The s. 15 arguments advanced by the Applicant and the Intervener
could be made in relation to any provision of the Criminal Code that
results in mandatory imprisonment, for example, the sentence for the
offence of murder. If disproportionate numbers of blacks are charged
with murder because of the discriminatory impact of poverty,
unemployment, poor housing and biased law enforcement decisions,
would it be appropriate to strike down the mandatory minimum penalty
for murder? Obviously not.105

With respect, Code J.’s analogy between drug and gun possession
offences on the one hand, and murder on the other, seems to unfairly
stretch the applicant’s section 15 arguments in Nur, especially given that
Gladue had already suggested that in the context of sentencing, the
violence of the offence points towards a higher sentence.
More importantly, it is not clear why these systemic and background
factors would not be relevant for the purposes of section 12 (assuming they
are not relevant for section 15). If anything, the opposite conclusion to that
of Code J. ought to be reached — that mandatory minimums are in need of
revision if they contribute to and exacerbate gross over-representation for
both African-Canadian and Indigenous persons.106 In Borde, for example,
the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that the African-Canadian accused
might be able to make Gladue arguments on the basis of similar systemic
and background factors to Indigenous offenders.107
Of telling relevance is the manner in which the hypothetical in Nur
was constructed, and the way in which Nur’s own personal factors were
not taken into account. In Nur, the Court ruled the provision
unconstitutional because it might capture relatively innocent licensing
offences — a conscientious, responsible gun owner who makes an error
as to the statutory requirements for the proper storage of his licensed,
legal firearm. It would be grossly disproportionate to his blameworthiness
104

Faced with evidence that approximately 62 per cent of s. 95 charges were laid against
African-Canadians even though they made up only 8.4 per cent of the population, Code J. did
acknowledge that the evidence before him showed “undoubtedly [that] a disproportionately high
number” of African-Canadians were charged. Nur (S.C.J.), supra, note 94, at paras. 76-77.
105
Id., at para. 80.
106
See notes 70-73, above.
107
R. v. Borde, [2003] O.J. No. 354, 63 O.R. (3d) 417, 2003 CanLII 4187, at para. 27 (Ont.
C.A.). See also R. v. Hamilton, [2003] O.J. No. 532, 172 C.C.C. (3d) 114, 8 C.R. (6th) 215 (Ont.
S.C.J.), affd [2004] O.J. No. 3252, 72 O.R. (3d) 1, 186 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (Ont. C.A.).
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if failing to properly lock an ammunition box could lead to a three-year
sentence of imprisonment for this offender.
Left unsaid was that the “reasonable hypothetical” that the Court drew
upon was no hypothetical. It was based, as the dissenting judges noted,
on the actual case of John Snobelen, the former Minister of Education
and then-Natural Resources Minister of Ontario. Snobelen was brought
to the attention of police when his ex-wife noted the existence of an
unlicensed firearm that was shipped to his Canadian home from his 212acre ranch in Oklahoma. Snobelen had sold his ranch, forgotten about the
gun that was there when it was shipped, and then forgotten to dispose of
it once he received it in Canada. He was charged with a summary
offence, pleaded guilty under the provision and provided character
references, with reference also made to his public service; he ultimately
received an absolute discharge.108
This hypothetical, stripped of its context and history, abstracted and
re-presented as a neutral construct, formed the basis of the section 12
violation in Nur. Yet no regard was given to the seemingly relevant
circumstances of Nur himself: a 19-year old refugee from Somalia; who
lived in an overcrowded townhouse with his parents and eight siblings;
who escaped a war and, from the time he was six, lived in one of
Toronto’s most notoriously crime-ridden neighbourhoods where he
nonetheless excelled; described by a teacher as “‘an exceptional student
and athlete who excelled in the classroom and on the basketball court …
an incredible youth with unlimited academic and great leadership
skills’”; and, described by his employer as “professional, punctual,
creative … [with] role model characteristics”; with no criminal record,
and no indication as to how he came to possess the gun he was found
with;109 and no recognition that for the particular offence he was
eventually charged with, there was clear evidence of disproportionate
charging of Blacks.
None of this is to say that Snobelen and Nur are equivalent
individuals enmeshed in equivalent circumstances, only that the idea that
one’s case constitutes a reasonable hypothetical and another one does not
is a matter in need of greater justification. Yet none has been forthcoming
from the Court on this point about how to personalize the characteristics
108

R. v. Snobelen, [2008] O.J. No. 6021 (Ont. C.J.).
Justice Code further noted that the Crown had not proven if Nur possessed the gun before
he arrived at the site of his arrest, when he joined a group of young men outside the site of his arrest,
or if he participated in any of the threatening acts of those other young men present at the time (and
which had precipitated a call to the police). Nur (S.C.J.), supra, note 94, at paras. 34, 61.
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of the offender in the reasonable hypothetical. As noted above, the Court
has yet to develop a hypothetical that takes into account the Indigenous
or racialized identity of the offender. Having acknowledged in Nur the
need to admit some personal characteristics of the hypothetical offender
as long as they did not produce remote or far-fetched examples,110 the
majority in Lloyd eschewed the opportunity to clarify this central
question. Indeed, the majority in Lloyd made no reference to personal
characteristics even as it mapped out the life of a hypothetical drug
addicted dealer who rehabilitated himself.
It is of interest that no majority of the Court has ever included race or
Indigenous status as a part of the reasonable hypothetical in spite of
proven over-representation patterns. Speaking generously, only twice has
race been referenced in the Court’s reasonable hypothetical opinions, and
on both of those occasions it was the dissenting justices who raised the
issue. First in Nur, race was implicitly raised where the dissenting judges
pointed to the actual history of the Snobelen case on which the majority’s
hypothetical was based.111 As noted above, the race and class differences
between Snobelen and Nur are readily apparent, even if they are
unacknowledged by the Court. The second and explicit notation of race
was in Lloyd, where the dissenting opinion referred to intervener
submissions that developed hypotheticals based on race, indigeneity,
drug addiction and the unique experience of female offenders. Echoing
Code J.’s remarks in the trial decision, the dissenting justices cautioned
against allowing those characteristics to “overwhelm the analysis”.112 In
this way, the continuing lack of acknowledgement of the race of actual
offenders in section 12 cases, and the ongoing construction of reasonable
hypotheticals that lack any racial identity, constitute further examples of
the erasure of race (and differentiated experiences based on race) from
the criminal justice system.113
Critics of this argument may well respond that it seems churlish to
criticize the Court on this point given that ultimately the mandatory
minimums in both Nur and Lloyd were ruled unconstitutional. It may be
that, aware of the tiresome rhetoric about judicial activism and
interference with Parliamentary intent, the Court found it unnecessary to
turn to more controversial personal characteristics that veer too close to
section 15 grounds in order to achieve the same result.
110
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Nur, supra, note 2, at para. 73 et seq.
Id., at para. 127 (dissenting reasons of Moldaver J.).
Lloyd, supra, note 1, at paras. 101-103.
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While this is a plausible argument, the Court’s decision is neither
neutral nor consequence-free. First, avoiding the question of race in
section 12 also avoids addressing the question of disparate impacts under
section 15 that have been the subject of much recent criticism.114
Intentional or not, the failure to consider racialized and gendered
hypotheticals or to fully consider the race of the actual accused in
assessing the constitutionality of the provision under the first branch of
the section 12 test has the ancillary benefit of not revitalizing or
contradicting what appears to be a rather moribund state of affairs in
adverse effects litigation.
Erasing the race (among other potentially relevant grounds such as
gender or even socio-economic class) of the hypothetical offender
reflects the broader tendencies of the legal system to ignore or justify its
discriminatory effects by first abstracting away from the particular
wrinkles of the specific offender it judges, and then re-examining that
bereft persona in light of the neutral, universal reasonable person that
McLachlin J. envisaged in Creighton.115 Once diluted into their platonic
form, individual offenders become bystanders to the subsequent legal
analysis that purports to consider the reasonableness of their behaviour.
Accused persons become holograms at their own trials, present but
flickering as they are necessarily denuded of substance in order to enable
a pseudo-scientific process of reasonability examinations.
That process is pseudo-scientific because the justification for erasure
of individual characteristics in constructing the reasonable person is that
it allows for a meaningfully objective standard to be derived. Yet
contrary to McLachlin J.’s formulation, the reasonable person often
“bears the characteristics of the dominant classes in the community and
so tacitly entrenches the privileges of that class in criminal law
doctrine.”116 The question of reasonableness is implicitly subjectivized
through the infusion of the particular views of the judge(s) at hand,117 a
114
See, e.g., J. Watson-Hamilton & J. Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s
Approach to Adverse Effects Discrimination Under Section 15 of the Charter” (2014), 19:2 Review
of Constitutional Studies 191; and R. Cairns Way, “An Opportunity for Equality: Kokopenace and
Nur at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 61 Crim. L.Q. 465.
115
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) described this process in R. v. Creighton, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 632, at para. 63 (S.C.C.).
116
D. Young, “Claims for Recognition and the Generalized Other: The Reasonable Person
and Judgment in Criminal Law” (2008) 23 C.J.L.S. 15, at 23-24 [hereinafter “Young”].
117
M.-È. Sylvestre, “The Redistributive Potential of Section 7 of the Charter: Incorporating
Socio-Economic Context in Criminal Law and in the Adjudication of Rights” (2010-2011) 42
Ottawa L. Rev. 389-409, at 394.
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fear recognized in the Supreme Court.118 The reasonable person remains
an equally subjective concept, albeit one usually constructed as the
amalgam of a specific constellation of gendered, racialized, and socioeconomic experiences: the “default characteristics” of the reasonable
person are those of a privileged white man.119 While this has begun to
change in some specific contexts of the law,120 the reasonable person
concept arguably has become justificatory in nature — “a vehicle for
expressing the ultimate judicial point of view, rather than for questioning
it.”121 Section 12 jurisprudence, however, remains relatively untroubled
by such considerations as the actual experience of the actual offenders
facing the punishment in question and — as seen in the Court’s reliance
on the case of John Snobelen in Nur — at times explicitly and actively
adopts the “default characteristics” of the middle class white male.
Second, the Court’s lack of reference to race, for example, does not
mean race is absent from its decision. The dissents in both Nur and Lloyd
point out the racialized dynamics of the decisions by identifying a
wealthy, White middle-aged male politician turned rancher as the source
of one of the hypotheticals, and explicitly rejecting African-Canadian,
Indigenous, and female experiences as overwhelming and irrelevant to
the analysis. In the minority’s view, the normal, non-overwhelming
category that should be the starting point for section 12 is a highly
specific and highly racialized one of a White man. The majority’s failure
to mention race in either of these cases or even address the implications
of the minority position on these issues inadvertently whitewashes the
systemic racism of the criminal justice system from consideration under
section 12. That the dissent and majority in Lloyd argue over whether
including drug addiction and treatment in the construction of a
reasonable hypothetical is “far-fetched” or “remote” but implicitly (in the
case of the majority) and explicitly (in the case of the dissent) refuse to
118
In her dissenting judgment in Egan v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513,
at 546, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (S.C.C.), L’Heureux-Dubé J. warns of the futility of relying on the
“reasonable, secular, able-bodied white male”.
119
M. Moran, “The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perspective”, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1233 at 1276 (2010) [hereinafter “Moran”]: “The gist of the
worry is that without modification of his imputed or default characteristics, the reasonable person is
presumptively male, white, able-bodied, literate and the like.”
120
See, e.g., Young, supra, note 116, examining R. v. M.L.B., [2004] S.J. No 755 (Sask.
Prov. Ct.); R. v. Lavallee, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) and
R. v. McConnell, [1996] S.C.J. No. 51, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 48 C.R. (4th) 199 (S.C.C.).
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Moran, supra, note 119, at 1278. Moran further notes, at 1281, that in equality and
discrimination claims, the reasonable person standard is more likely to undermine substantive
equality goals.
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admit race into the analysis suggests the Court going to great lengths to
avoid commenting on the elephant in the room: the well-documented
over-policing and over-representation of racial minorities in Canada.
In such a context, there ought to be nothing remote or far-fetched
about including race in the construction of a reasonable hypothetical,
particularly given the admonitions in section 12 cases to focus on
situations that “commonly arise in day-to-day” situations122 and that are
based on reported cases as a starting point to which “additional
circumstances can be added”.123 Justice Code was presented with exactly
this possibility in Nur, when given evidence that the offence Nur was
charged with was one that in his community of Toronto was
overwhelmingly charged against African-Canadians. Yet both Code J.
and the Supreme Court go out of their way to avoid race in the section 12
argumentation. Similarly, in Lloyd, the minority complains in part that
plugging “addiction” in as a feature of the accused in the hypothetical is
unfair, even though Lloyd himself was recognized as a drug addict.
Indeed, given the nature of controlled substances and drugs, and the
rationale for their control, there ought to be little surprising about the
idea that many drug users and traffickers are also drug addicts. While it is
a limited step, the Court’s inclusion of addiction as a characteristic of the
individual in Lloyd is an important step even if it is translated into the
context of a redemption narrative.
As noted above, it is possible that the Court might see the inclusion of
race or addiction or indigeneity as unnecessarily “stacking the deck” in
favour of finding sentencing provisions unconstitutional. Yet if the
Court’s concern is about presenting neutral hypotheticals to test the
constitutional boundaries of sentencing provisions, surely there is
nothing more neutral than the cases that police and Crown choose to
pursue. Judicial design of an example makes that hypothetical vulnerable
to attacks that the judge has tainted the example in a way that favours his
or her ultimate view on the impugned law. Reliance on actual cases that
are chosen initially by law enforcement agents and prosecutors sheds this
complaint, and judges concerned with neutrality ought to draw their
examples from specific cases. In many instances, given the over-policing
of particular communities, this will lead to the entirely defensible
inclusion of race and/or indigeneity (and perhaps even gender and class)
in the hypothetical.
122
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When the inclusion of such factors is based on actual cases, the resultant
hypothetical is much less vulnerable to critique. As it stands, the reluctance
to include these factors doubly punishes offenders. At the front-end of the
criminal process, these individuals are disproportionately likely to be
investigated and charged for some offences. At the back-end however, postconviction, they cannot rely on the fact of that disproportionate attention
when reasonable hypotheticals are being designed. Explaining to the Black
or Indigenous offender that her race is not to be considered because it
would be favourable to her would be hard to reconcile with the experience
of many minorities caught up in the criminal justice system. Of course,
from the point of view of the offender, the logic becomes sadly coherent if
it is explained that her blackness or indigeneity are not considered because
it might lead to less punishment for her.
Finally, the avoidance of race in the design of reasonable
hypotheticals has powerful implications for the continued viability of
mandatory minimum sentences and other potential constitutional
challenges. There first is a risk that the lack of recognition of race in
section 12 analyses to date will lead to the same result with respect to the
exercise of statutory exemptions if and when they are incorporated into
the Criminal Code. In addition, the effect of avoiding the question of
race has been to prolong the lifespan of mandatory minimum sentences.
In their declaration that including race would “overwhelm the analysis”,
the dissent in Lloyd echoed the comments of Code J. in Nur. There, in the
context of a section 15 argument, Code J. acknowledged that the fact of
widespread discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law would render
virtually every mandatory imprisonment provision unconstitutional.
Unacknowledged in the section 12 jurisprudence is this background
concern that the inclusion of race in a reasonable hypothetical would
have catastrophic effects on the continuation of mandatory minimum
sentences, far more than that contemplated by Lloyd as it currently
stands. It is a Kafkaesque condition that prevents the acknowledgement
of race in a manner that might favour the offender precisely because of
the otherwise pervasive emphasis on race that discriminates against and
harms those same individuals elsewhere in the criminal justice process.

V. CONCLUSION
What remains most remarkable about Lloyd is not how much it changes,
but how much it leaves relatively unaltered. At one end, the various
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predictions that no mandatory minimums can withstand scrutiny under the
section 12 application seem premature and even wilfully blind to the
pragmatism that continues to infuse section 12 and Charter jurisprudence in
respect of a range of other rights (primarily section 8 and section 10) when
those rights are implicated in the context of criminal law.
Yet even if some mandatory minimum sentences continue to fall,
many will remain and a number have been upheld even after Lloyd. The
new rules about personal characteristics in reasonable hypotheticals offer
some greater leeway perhaps, but little guidance. And, while Lloyd
injected some degree of personalization into the imagined offender
caught in the reasonable hypothetical in that case, neither Lloyd nor Nur
nor any other cases have consistently engaged with the idea that
mandatory minimum sentences might have a grossly disproportionate
impact on offenders who are members of historically disadvantaged
groups and for whom, as a result of their membership in such groups,
mandatory minimum sentences might be grossly disproportionate.
Moreover, the normative foundation for this ongoing omission lies in
part in the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty, but is also being
developed by the Court in adjacent areas of the law — in establishing the
standard of review for sentences, in adjudicating disparate impacts cases
under section 15, and in subordinating a substantive equality-infused
notion of proportionality to a more formalist notion.
What is most remarkable is that in its desire to avoid constructing the
most sympathetic counter-example for section 12 purposes — even
where doing so would reflect the common day-to-day experiences of
many offenders — the Court effectively treats hypothetical accused with
greater empathy and compassion, and arguably does a better job of
recognizing the intersectional realities of their hypothetical experiences,
than it does the offenders actually before them.

